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Paula L. W. Sabloff (USA)*
It is not surprising that since Mongolia’s separation from the Soviet Union
Genghis Khan has rapidly become a symbol of national unity. Born in 1162 in
Hentii Province (aimag), Mongolia, Genghis Khan had united the Mongol peoples
into an independent, sovereign nation in 1189. By 1206, the year he was elected
Genghis Khan of All Mongols, he had expanded Mongol territory to roughly its
present size. Over the next twenty-one years, he and his sons conquered the
largest land mass ever held by one ruler: from Korea to Persia and the Caspian
Sea, from Russia south to the Yellow River of China (Ratchnevsky 1997). Clearly
Genghis Khan is the author of Mongolian independence.
Today’s Mongolian government promotes Genghis Khan as a symbol of
national unity and independence. His picture is on the three highest denomina-
tions of Mongolian money. The ceremonial ger (yurt) located in the inner court-
yard of Parliament houses a huge statue of the seated ruler; visiting dignitaries
are brought here for ‘photo-ops.’ Right outside the legislative chamber on the
first floor of Parliament, nine ceremonial ‘banners’ of white horsetails stand
opposite a bust of Genghis Khan. The banners are paraded at the Naadam
festival and then placed in a circular holder before the reviewing stand of the
President. As 1,000 wrestlers march into the arena during the opening parade,
they literally make obeisance to the nine banners, bowing before them.   This
year the government has organized a year-long celebration of the 840th anniver-
sary of Genghis Khan’s birth. Even more festivities are planned for 2006, the
800th anniversary of “state’ formation.
Genghis Khan’s picture is everywhere in Ulaanbaatar, the capital city. It is
found on everything from wool carpets and paintings that decorate homes to
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commercial labels such as vodka and beer bottles to cigarette packs and dozens
of tourist items.
Clearly Genghis Khan has become a major symbol of Mongolian indepen-
dence. But he is more than a symbol of sovereignty, for recent research sug-
gests that his ideas on governance form the core of Mongolian citizens’ political
culture (Falloff 2001, 2002). These ideas include the four basic principles of
liberal democracy - the ‘pillars’ of democracy according to Western scholars
(Diamond 1996, Myers 1996 and 1998, Huntington 1997). This statement does
not mean that Genghis Khan headed a democratic government any more than
King John did after he signed the Magna Carat. But Genghis Khan codified the
four principles of liberal democracy by 1206 - nine years before the Magna Carat
-and he did as willingly, not under duress as King John did.
Almost 800 years after the formation of the Mongol polity (1206), the
Mongolian people established a democratic, capitalist state when they ratified
the present constitution (1992).
Almost 800 years after the formation of the Mongol polity (1206), the
Mongolian people established a democratic, capitalist state when they ratified
the present constitution (1992). Like many post-Soviet countries, the present
government - a president elected by popular vote and a one-chamber parliament
headed by a prime minister - draws inspiration from international (Western Euro-
pean) democratic forms and culture (Runic 1999). But the democratic political
culture is not an import. Rather, it is built on the Mongolians’ nomadic culture of
independence as well as their knowledge of Genghis Khan’s government, which
comes from their written and oral history.
This paper begins with historians’ descriptions of the democratic prin-
ciples embedded in Genghis Khan’s home rule. Their accounts - dating from
about a decade after his death to the present - show that this great leader laid the
foundation for democratic culture even though he did not preside over a demo-
cratic state. It then presents findings on the political culture of Mongolian citi-
zens today (1998). This research shows that the majority of people interviewed
credit Genghis Khan with laying the foundation for democracy as well as inde-
pendence. Analyzed by demographic category, the research suggests that the
understanding of Genghis Khan as founder of democratic principles for Mongolia
is shared by citizens of different backgrounds - nationalities, religions, regions,
residence, education, etc. Thus Genghis Khan’s story has become a unifying
force for the establishment and maintenance of democracy in Mongolia today.
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The Democratic Principles of Genghis Khan 1
We know about Genghis Khan from several historical sources. The first
and most important is The Secret History of the Mongols, which was probably
written by Shigi-hutukhu, a Tatar captive raised by Genghis Khan’s mother
(Ratchnevsky 1997, p xiv; Morgan 1990, pp 9-12). Later accounts written less
than 100 years after Genghis Khan’s death are from Ata-Malik Juvaini (writing
1253-1260), who served the new Mongol governors in northern Persia (Boyle
1997 p xxxvii), and Rashid ad-Din, a doctor turned chief minister and historian of
the court of Ilkhan Ghazan, Mongol ruler of Persia and Iraq (Morgan 1990, p 11).
Ad-Din’s account, written at the end of the thirteenth century, was based on the
official Mongolian history, the Altan Debter {The Golden Notebook), which
has since been lost. Other Western historians have written about Genghis Khan
from the Western, or conquered perspective (ibid, 16-27).]
The supposedly definitive biography was written by Paul Ratchnevsky
(1997). Genghis Khan: His Life and Legacy checks one historical reference
against the other in the hope of determining the “historical truth.” This book
stimulated the historical part of my research, for Ratchnevsky’s description of
Genghis Khan’s home rule made me suspect that he had actually laid the foun-
dation for modern, or “liberal” democracy.2 The Secret History of the Mongols
confirmed my suspicion that Genghis Khan did include some democratic prin-
ciples in his government.
For democratic rule to exist, Genghis Khan first united the Mongoijribes
into one independent polity3 that had the right to make its own laws. He then
fought neighboring groups (the Tangud, Jurchin Jin, and Chin Dynasty), free-
ing the Mongols from paying tribute or serving at the pleasure of foreign rulers.
Eventually he conquered these groups and controlled the Silk Roads (Cleaves
1982, §139, 153-54, 189, 200; Morgan 1990, pp 61-69; Academy of Sciences MPR
1990, pp 98-101).
Having established the right to self-rule, Genghis Khan incorporated some
form of the four pillars of democracy into Mongol governance. Some were tradi-
tional parts of Mongolian culture, predating him; others were borrowed from
surrounding cultures. Genghis Khan contributed additional components, and
1This section is a paraphrased version of the same section in Sabloff (2002).
2 The main tenets of liberal democracy are listed in a seminal article by Diamond
(1996). His nine points may be subsumed under the four “pillars” of democracy used by
various authors in Myers (1996, 1998).
3 Some Mongolian historians use the term ‘state’ to describe Genghis Khan and his
successors’ rule of the heartland. See Baabar (1999, p 24), and Academy of Sciences MPR
(1990, p 98).
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he combined the various principles into one government structure, which was
unique for his time.
The first democratic principle is participatory government. Genghis Khan
took the nomadic tribal tradition of electing a leader in mass assembly (the
hural)4 to the next step by having a Great Assembly (Jh Hural) of Mongols
meet periodically to discuss policy issues such as decisions concerning war
and peace. Genghis Khan also maintained a Council of Wise Men that met with
him regularly. Acting as his cabinet, they helped him think through major policy
decisions. While he started his Council with Mongols, he eventually included
men from other tribes and nations (Cleaves 1982, §204). While true participatory
democracy includes all citizens in the decision process, the Great Assembly (Jh
Hural) and Council of Wise Men are good starting places.5 However, it should
be noted that while some historians consider his rule to have been a military
democracy, others call it a military dictatorship (Ratchnevsky 1997, pp 42, 90-92,
150; Academy of Sciences MPR 1990, p 100; Cleaves 1982, §154).
Rule of law is the second democratic principle. In 1206, Genghis Khan
instructed Shigi-hutukhu to form a judicial system that eventually extended
throughout the Great Mongol Empire. As the first judge, Shigi-hutukhu listened
to disputes and transgressions of the law (robbery, deception, adultery), impos-
ing sentences ranging from fines to death. Although the laws were designed to
apply to Mongols, Genghis Khan often rewarded his loyal followers by exempt-
ing them from punishment - for up to nine transgressions (Cleaves 1982, §203,
209-23; Morgan 1990, pp 96-99, Ratchnevsky 1997, p 95).
Genghis Khan never achieved this principle, equality of citizens. However,
he initiated it in two different ways. He established the related principle of
meritocracy, which enables individuals to rise from one status to another through
their own initiative (Havel 1998, pp 27-28; Kohak 1996, pp 3-4). He organized the
entire population into an army of fighting men and their supporters - family
members who traveled with them and supplied them with food, horses, weap-
ons, armor, and clothing. He handpicked the leaders for each army unit, select-
ing them for their loyalty, ability, and bravery, not because they came from noble
birth. Thus Genghis Khan established a meritocracy for the organizing unit of
the entire society (Cleaves 1982, §203-23).
4 Among the Mongols, the noble family of a tribe provided the tribal ruler, or khan, from
among the male heirs, brothers, or nephews of the previous ruler. The final decision was
made by a formal assembly of Mongols (Bacon 1958, p57 based on The Secret History
§57).
5 Even in ancient Athens, only men who were not slaves were considered citizens; women
and slaves were not allowed to participate in the democratic process (Finer 1999, pp. 341-
68; American School of Classical Studies at Athens 1987).
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He also staffed the Council of Wise Men according to the principle of
meritocracy. No matter what their status or country of origin, he welcomed wise
men into his advisory council. In fact, the story goes that Genghis Khan invited a
beggar known for his wisdom into the Council (Academy of Sciences 1990, p 100).
Genghis Khan also exhibited a remarkable respect for women. It is true that
at the time women could be given or sold by their male kin and that they had no
voice in government. But The Secret History gives several examples of women
making key decisions, telling Genghis Khan How to live and what to do, which is
unusual and shows that women had some stature within Mongolian culture. For
example, his wife Borate warned him that his blood brother Jamukha was plotting
against him even when Genghis Khan assumed that their blood-brother obliga-
tion and affection were strong; his mother stopped him from committing fratricide.
Most interesting is the passage in The Secret History of the Mongols that uses the
same phrases to describe Borate as Genghis Khan. He is described as a boy
With fire in his eyes,
With light in his face (§62, 82, 149)
She is described with the phrases reversed, i.e., as a maiden
With light in her face,
With fire in her eyes. (§66)
Cleaves, the famous Harvard scholar and translator of The Secret History,
remarks on the unusual use of the same phrases for a young girl and a world
ruler (p 15, footnote 44). While these brief accounts do not confer political
equality, they set the baseline for treating women with respect and therefore
have the potential to pave the way for political equality.
Genghis Khan did not grant his people the basic human rights and free-
doms that form the final pillar of liberal democracy and that today’s Mongolians
prize so highly. But he allowed a certain amount of freedom of speech or he
never would have figured out who to invite onto the Wise Men Council. He also
championed freedom of religion, as his own religion (shamanism) required. As
he built the Great Mongol Empire, he declared that all religions should be re-
spected and that none should be elevated above the others. He followed the
principle even in his own capital, Harhorin (Ratchnevsky 1997, p 197).
The historical accounts and historians strongly suggest that Genghis Khan
codified and sometimes introduced the four pillars of democracy to Mongolian
society by 1206. The next step in my research was to find whether or not there is
correspondence between today’s citizens’ ideas on democracy and then whether
or not today’s citizens believe that Genghis Khan’s governance is related to
their current political culture.
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Modern Mongolian Political Culture
In the summer of 1998, thirteen Mongolians and I conducted research on
the political culture of Mongolian citizens.6 seven of the researchers worked in
Ulaanbaatar, the capital city of Mongolia. Six others interviewed people in Hove,
a town of 27,000 that had been the economic and political center of western
Mongolia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ulaanbaatar is a so-
phisticated city, the majority of whose inhabitants are Halh Mongols practicing
Lamaism, Shamanism, or both. Halh Mongols form the vast majority of Mongo-
lians. Hovd, on the other hand, is composed mostly of Oirad Mongols or Kazakhs
(sometimes called Mongol Turks); the latter form 4.3 percent of the population
(National Statistics Office 2001, p 50).
The researchers interviewed citizens of voting age in the two urban centers
and surrounding countryside. For the first protocol,7 we interviewed people who
fit the subcategories of the following demographic categories: gender (male/ fe-
male), age (18-26, 27-39, 40-54/59, 55/60 and above8), education level (less than a
high school diploma, high school/vocational school diploma, technical school/
college degree, university degree and above), occupation (including herders, gov-
ernment workers, business people, skilled workers, professionals, pensioners,
and students); ethnic identity (Halh, Kazakh, Oirad, Buryat), religious affiliation
(Buddhist, no religion, Muslim, Shamanist, Christian), and political preference
(including the party voted for in recent democratic elections: 1992, 1996, 1997).
Because we wanted to obtain data concerning respondents’ cultural knowl-
edge, we used the methodology of cognitive anthropology, which allows for
quota sampling (Sabloff 1996, pp 123-27). We found at least 20 respondents in
each demographic subcategory, as required in cognitive guidelines (Borgatti
1996). We administered the first set of questions to 867 respondents, 402 in
Hovd and the surrounding countryside and 465 in and around Ulaanbaatar.
Only 855 were usable, that is, the demographic profiles matched the responses.
6 The research was sponsored by the National Science Foundation, Grant SBR-9806345).
The Co-Director was Dr. G. Nyamdavaa, then Rector of National University of Mongolia-
Hovd, and coordinated by Ms. Magsarj a Tsetseglen of Ulaanbaatar.
7 I proposed all protocols and the researchers in Ulaanbaatar and Hovd modified them
to make them acceptable to respondents in the Mongolian language.
8 As there were no official guidelines for selecting the age groups, I separated youths (18-
19) who had experienced all of their education during the non-Communist years (1990-
1998) from youths who had some education under the Communist regime (20-26), young
adults of working age (some were unemployed or still students) who might be raising young
families (27-39), adults in their middle years who were of working age (40-55), and adults
of retirement age although many of them were still working. In Mongolia, the retirement age
is 54 for women and 55 for men. Thus the women enter this category at 54.
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As the demographic composition of our sample closely matched the demo-
graphic composition of the nation at large, our findings may be generalizeable to
the larger Mongolian voting-age citizenry.
In order to learn our respondents’ perception of democracy, we asked them
to list all the characteristics they could think of that make a country a democracy.
The 855 respondents wrote 2,830 entries, which Ms. Munhtuya Altangerel (a
native Mongolian and University of Pennsylvania B.A.) and I combined into 119
categories, or “items.” Items mentioned by 10 percent or more respondents are
listed. We analyzed the data using ANTHROPAC software (ibid), and with the
help of John Gate wood (personal communication and Gate wood 1999).
Table 1 shows that our respondents’ most important (most frequently
mentioned) characteristic of democracy is personal freedom, which includes
freedom of speech, religion, and movement (freedom to live anywhere within the
country or to travel abroad); economic freedom (freedom to choose one’s occu-
pation and to strike); the freedom to hold demonstrations; and pluralism.
Table 1. Respondents’ Characteristics of a Democratic
Country In a democratic country,
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The prominence of personal freedom suggests that this pillar of liberal
democracy is a vital part of Mongolian political culture. The fact that idiosyn-
cratic forms of personal freedom (different from what Americans might name, for
instance) appear on the list suggests that the concept has been internalized, i.e.,
it is not just an abstraction.
Representative government here linked with participatory government,
which is perhaps the most critical component of liberal democracy (Diamond
1996), is the second most frequently mentioned item. The majority of mentions
(254 out of 274) are for ‘multi-party elections.’ The second largest category
under this item is ‘government of and by the people,’ which was mentioned 163
times. This is distinct from ‘government for the people, which received only 22
mentions, too few to fit on this table.
Because human rights are mentioned so frequently, they stand alone as
the third item on the list. This item includes the general heading of ‘human
rights’ as well as specific mentions of the right to life, health, education, employ-
ment, and political participation. Most of these are found in the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights and the 1992 Mongolian Constitution.
The fourth item is free market economy, which includes open competition
and ‘privatization of all kinds of property.’ This item signals that Mongolians
have made the transition from a political culture of’ Communist democracy’ to
liberal democracy. A people cannot associate democracy with capitalism or po-
litical rights and still believe in the Leninist concept of economic democracy.9
Mongolian respondents express the importance of law in the fifth item.
Under this general heading are respondents’ desire for ‘rule of law’ and ‘equality
under the law’ - two pillars of democracy (ibid., Myers 1996, 1998). Other things
mentioned by respondents in this category are respect for just laws and fear of
lawlessness.
The sixth item is ‘glasnost,’ or an open, stable and reliable government
that is not corrupt. This was a true concern in the summer of 1998, a time of
turmoil when the Democratic Coalition government was forming yet another
cabinet. The seventh item is ‘freedom of the media.’ Mongolians recognize that
the media must be free from government control and free to criticize government
if a nation is to remain democratic.
Our respondents listed a ‘just, humane, and democratic society’ as the
eighth most important characteristic of a democratic nation. Perhaps this senti-
9 Lenin (1917) defines democracy as economic equality and the abolition of classes.
True equality means that even when people are different (produce at different rates and have
different needs), they receive what they need from the bounty of the state.
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ment was stimulated by the years of ‘purges’ (sometimes exile but usually death)
during the Communist years; perhaps it referred to the current concern for kind-
ness and honesty among citizens. It was probably coupled with the following
item, which links democracy to lawlessness and callousness.
The final item is ‘democracy is a better way to live.’ By this Mongolians
mean that it is better to live in an independent, democratic country where people
can trust the government, enjoy peace, and feel good about their nation. Having
tried feudalism under the Manchu Dynasty and socialism under a Communist
regime, our respondents had some experience with other types of government.
Table 1 gives strong indication that our respondents had adopted the
Western definition of liberal democracy within eight years of gaining freedom
from Soviet control. The key indicators are the high support of personal free-
doms, the idea that government is run by the people rather than an elite bureau-
cracy, and the idea of political rather than economic equality. In fact, our respon-
dents advocate economic inequality, which naturally results from open compe-
tition and privatization.
We decided to determine whether or not there is statistically significant
variation on people’s concept of democracy in any of the categories as the data
were collected by region (Hovd and Ulaanbaatar) and ten demographic catego-
ries. We10 selected five critical characteristics of a democratic country and per-
formed chi-square analysis on each demographic category. The first three items
(personal freedoms, freedom of speech, and government of/by the people) are
indicative of liberal democracy as described above. The fourth and fifth items
mark an exit from the Communist concept of an economic democracy and en-
trance into the Western concept of a political democracy (see footnote 9). The
final column includes all the people in a demographic subcategory who marked
at least two of the five items. In the table, the starred items exhibit significant
statistical difference among the subcategories at the .05 level.
Having selected the key items from table 1, we administered the chi square
test on ten demographic categories. Those categories with statistically signifi-
cant variability suggest that (a) favors other than chance ore responsible for the
differences among the subcategories, and (b) there is lack of agreement - true
difference - among subcategories.
The results may be seen in Table 2. The items in bold and followed by a
star in the row giving the chi square results show significant statistical differ-
ence at the .05 level.
10 The methodology was suggested and actual statistical analysis performed by Dr.
Steven Marcus, epidemiologist of the School of Social Work, University of Pennsylvania.
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at least 2 
Region P=0001* •c.OOOl* <.0001* <.0001* <.0001* <.0001* 
Hovd 402 25.37% 15.17% 7.21% 7.96% 3.23% 11.69% 
Ulaanbaatar 453 37.53 26.71 18.98 38.41 12.58 38.85 
Education P=.OO14* <.0001* <.0001* <.0001* .0032* <.0001* 
Low 217 22.58 10.14 5.53 14.75 4.61 11.98 
Medium 328 32.62 18.60 10.37 23.17 6.71 23.78 
High 310 37.42 31.94 22.26 31.61 12.26 38.39 
Nationality P=.O298* .0015* .0015* <.0001* .0003* <.0001* 
Khalkha 519 34.49 24.08 16.57 32.56 11.18 32.76 
Mongol Turk 63 19.05 4.76 3.17 7.94 1.59 6.35 
Other 273 29.67 19.78 9.89 11.72 4.03 17.95 
Religious 
Identity 
 P=.2O21 .0035* .1083 .0002* .0176* .0002* 
Buddhist 398 33.67 24.12 12.31 25.13 10.80 29.15 
Muslim 48 20.83 6.25 4.17 6.25 0.00 6.25 
Christian 30 40.00 36.67 20.00 50.00 3.33 46.67 
Other(none, 
/shaman) 
376 30.32 19.15 15.16 23.14 6.65 23.67 
Residence .0002* .0075* .0005* .0035* .8785 .0003* 
City 726 34.30 22.87 15.15 25.90 8.13 28.37 
Countryside 129 17.83 12.40 3.88 13.95 8.53 13.18 
Political 
Preference 
 P=.0045* .0202* .9505 .2084 .0375* .0073* 
Socialism 124 20.16 12.90 12.90 18.55 3.23 15.32 
Democracy 679 32.99 22.09 13.11 23.71 8.69 26.66 
Age P=5984 .6078 .5009 .0146* .0509* .0629 
17-26 272 34.19 23.90 13.24 30.51 6.25 30.88 
27-39 267 30.71 20.97 11.24 20.97 6.37 21.35 
40-54/59 209 32.54 19.14 15.79 23.44 12.44 27.75 
55+/60+ 106 27.36 19.81 15.09 16.98 9.43 22.64 
Economic 
Preference 
 P=.O265* .0246* .8226 .2070 .7745 .0657 
Centrally 
planned 
54 22.22 7.41 11.11 18.52 5.56 12.96 
Free market 314 36.94 20.70 13.06 21.34 8.28 28.03 
Both 481 29.52 23.28 13.93 25.99 8.32 26.20 
Type of 
Democracy 
 P=.2598 .4960 .3853 .5990 .6624 .7368 
Parliamen-
tary 
306 34.31 22.55 14.71 23.20 8.82 26.80 
 
Presidential 540 30.56 20.56 12.59 24.81 7.96  ___ 25.74 
Gender P=.4246 .1039 .3018 .4438 .2541 .4416 
Male 445 33.03 19.10 14.61 25.17 9.21 27.19 
Female 410 30.49 23.66 12.20 22.93 7.07 24.88 
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N.B. Percentages are the percent of respondents per subcategory who
include the item on their free list. In this table, ‘individual freedoms’ does not
include ‘freedom of speech,’ which is presented in the next column.
The category exhibiting the greatest statistical variability (that is, the dif-
ference between subcategories for all six columns is significant) is ‘Region.’
Clearly the people of Hovd and Ulaanbaatar think differently about democracy.
This is not surprising as we know that people ‘inside the Beltway’ of Washing-
ton DC and outside the Beltway think differently about politics. The popula-
tions of the regions are different in occupation, ethnicity, religion, and educa-
tion levels.
The other two categories showing statistically significant differences for
all six items are ‘Educational Level’ and ‘Nationality.’ As the project’s database
is just at the beginning stage of analysis, we cannot offer possible explanation
of why these three categories are the only demographic categories to show
significant differentiation over the range of items. But the current data suggest
that nationality has some bearing on - or at least some correlation with - people’s
ideas on democracy, which is relevant to this paper.
Is it significant that ‘Religious Identity,’ which correlates so strongly with
nationality for the Kazakhs (most of whom are Muslim) does not register the
same degree of difference among items as nationality? Two items do not show
significant difference at all. They are ‘Personal Freedoms’ and ‘Government of/
by the People.’ Yet ‘Personal Freedoms’ shows significant difference in six of the
ten demographic categories. ‘Government of/by the People’ shows difference in
four categories (education, nationality, residence, and region).
Some demographic categories that my Mongolian friends and colleagues
predicted great difference in (‘Age’ and ‘Political Preference,’ for example) proved
to be insignificant. However, they were right when they predicted that ‘Gender’
would be insignificant.
Genghis Khan as Unifying Force
Curious about people’s ideas on the possible connection between Genghis
Khan and modern political culture, we asked a smaller number of Mongolian
citizens (336) in Hovd and Ulaanbaatar what they thought of Genghis Khan. The
first question was: ‘Do you agree that in some sense there were democratic
principles practiced in the time of Genghis Khan?’ Two hundred and eight (61.9
percent) said yes; 63 (18.8 percent) said no; and 65 (19.3 percent) replied that
they do not know.
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When we performed the chi square test on the data according to nationali-
ties, we found that the difference among the groups was not statistically signifi-
cant (see Table 3).
Table 3. Do you agree that there were some democratic
norms or values in Genghis Khan’s time?
Nationality N Yes No Don't know 
Mongol Turks 33 16 5 12 
%  48.5 15.2 36.3 
     
Oirad/Western 
Mongols 73 40 17 16 
%  54.8 23.3 21.9 
     
Halh 56 29 13 14 
%  51.8 23.2 25.0 
     
Total 16211 85 35 42 
% 100 52.5 21.6 25.9 
     
P=0.05855     
We then asked a subset of the 336 respondents, ‘What democratic prin-
ciples could be borrowed from Genghis Khan’s time for use today?’ This time
195 respondents from Hovd and Ulaanbaatar answered the question. Their an-
swers were analyzed as free lists using ANTHROPAC (Borgatti 1996). Ms.
Altangerel and I grouped the 483 different terms mentioned into 164 items. The
frequency chart built from this database is found in Table 4.
11 We had matching demographic data and questions for 162 of the 195 respondents to
this question.
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Table 4. Mongolians’ Perception of Genghis Khan’s
Democratic Principles Under Genghis Khan’s rule,
1. Rule of law prevailed; the laws/legal 





2. All were equal before the law. 72 37% 
3. Leadership was strong, wise, and caring. 66 34% 
4. People revered, respected, and obeyed the 
government and its laws. 52 27% 
5. The principle of participatory democracy 
resided in the Wise Men's Council and Great 
Assembly. 
43 22% 
6. Personal freedoms (speech, religion), 
pluralism, and human rights were honored. 40 21% 
7. The state was strong in reputation, 
responsibility, power, and influence. 23 12% 
8. There the different peoples were united 
into one independent nation. 21 11% 
….   
13. The free market principle controlled the 
economy. 5 3% 
Participatory democracy is seen in item 5; the two legal requirements for
liberal democracy - rule of law and equality under the law - appear in items 1 and
2 respectively; and personal freedoms is represented in item 6. Free market
economy, which signals the acceptance of the Western definition of democracy
in Table 1, is mentioned as a characteristic of Genghis Khan’s government (see
item 13). And national sovereignty, one of the preconditions for democracy, is
also listed (item 8).
Table 4 includes additional characteristics admired in Genghis Khan’s gov-
ernment. These are well organized and strong government that exhibited strong
responsibility toward the people and therefore earned the people respect (items
4 and 7).
To determine whether or not the statistically significant demographic cat-
egories for citizens’ concepts of democracy were also significant for their ideas
on Genghis Khan, we applied the chi square test to six key items from Table 4,
creating Table 5.
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Table 5. Genghis Khan’s democratic principles













Region  .5768 .0174* .0814 .4473 .4667 
Hovd 71 22.54 38.03 26.76 14.08 2.82 
Ulaanbaatar 120 19.17 55.83 39.17 18.33 5.00 
       
Nationality  .5083 .0661 .0572 .2140 .7500 
Halh 130 19.23 51.54 39.23 19.23 4.62 
Kazakh 12 33.33 16.67 41.67 25.00 0.00 
Other 
(Oirad/Buryat) 
45 20.00 51.11 20.00 8.89 4.44 
       
Religious 
Identity 
 .6183 .2193 .7231 .5188 .7225 
Buddhist 97 21.65 53.61 34.02 20.62 3.09 
Muslim 7 28.57 14.29 42.86 14.29 0.00 
Christian 2 50.00 50.00 0 0 0.00 
Other 
(none/shaman) 
84 17.86 46.43 35.71 13.10 5.95 
       
Gender  .8447 .0172* .9974 .8663 .7741 
Male 110 20.19 41.82 34.55 16.36 4.55 
Female 81 19.75 59.26 34.57 17.28 3.70 
       
Age  .5621 .1579 .1822 .0459* .6516 
17-26 58 20.69 58.62 29.31 20.69 1.72 
27-39 50 20.00 48.00 46.00 26.00 6.00 
40-54/59 51 25.49 37.25 27.45 9.80 3.92 
55-Kf.), 
60+(m.) 
32 12.50 53.13 37.50 6.25 6.25 
       
Education  .0934 .2978 .0631 .2688 .2719 
Low 37 18.92 37.84 32.43 10.81 6.78 
Medium 59 11.86 50.85 23.73 13.56 0.00 
High 95 26.32 52.63 42.11 21.05 4.21 
N.B. Percentages are the percent of respondents per subcategory who
included the item on their list.
Table 5 shows that the differences within demographic categories are not
statistically significant at the .05 level. The few exceptions are region and gender
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for ‘Rule of Law’ and age for ‘Personal Freedom. Nationality and Religious
Identity show no significant variation as they did when people defined democ-
racy (see Table 2). Thus it appears that even the different nationalities share
knowledge of the democratic principles embedded in Genghis Khan’s story.
And although Kazakhs define democracy differently from other citizens, they
share an understanding that Genghis Khan contributed to democratic principles
for the present government. Thus Genghis Khan appears to pull together citi-
zens of different backgrounds. Conclusion
What are we to conclude about the political perceptions of different na-
tionalities from these preliminary findings? Clearly the Kazakhs and Oirads/
Buryats think differently about democracy from the Halhs. As the majority of
respondents in the latter nationality are western (Hovd) Oirads, we can reduce
the category to Oirads. Do the Kazakhs and Oirads feel differently from the Halh
because they live in different regions, or is the difference between regions ex-
plained by the different representations of ethnic groups (Oirad v. Halh) and
nationalities (Kazakh v. Halh and Oirad)? This database cannot answer this very
interesting question. However, the data can show the power of the Genghis
Khan legend. For the nationalities - Kazakhs, Oirads, and Halhs - have all ‘bought
in’ to the Genghis Khan legend: They agree to roughly the same extent that he
codified the basic tenets of democratic society that are in practice today: some
rudimentary form of participatory government, rule of law, equality under the
law, and personal freedoms including religious tolerance (Table 4). And they
agree that he brought Mongolians (not just Mongols) independent nation sta-
tus along with a well-organized, wise, and caring government.
If we return to the roots of the study of nationalism, we will remember that
Benedict Anderson (1991 pp 5-7) defined a nation as an “imagined community.”
“Imagined” because (a) the members do not have face-to-face relations with all
other members yet they believe that they share “communion,” (b) they imagine
the nation has finite territorial borders, (c) they consider it to be sovereign, and
(d) they feel a “comradeship” - a “fraternity” - among citizens even if there are
firm class boundaries.
The Mongolian State is comprised of thirty different nationalities and
ethnic groups. According to the 2000 census (National Statistics Office 2001, pp
130-131), 81.5 percent of the total population is Halh while 4.3 percent are Kazakh.
In the early 1990s, soon after the fall of the Soviet Union, about 40,000 Kazakhs
- citizens of Mongolia but members of the nationality that dominates nearby
Kazakhstan - migrated to Kazakhstan. After a few months, most returned to
Mongolia. Clearly they feel more at home in Mongolia than in Kazakhstan.
51
 Number 8-9, 2002The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
What makes them stay in Mongolia? What unites them with the Mongol
people? Citizenship and basic lifestyle, for one thing. But our database sug-
gests that they are also part of Anderson’s imagined Mongolian community
because they all know the story of Genghis Khan. And they ‘see’ the principles
of democratic society embedded in his story. They see him as more than the
founder of an independent nation; rather, they know that he planted the seeds
of liberal democracy, which have finally flowered in the post-Soviet era. Genghis
Khan may have been a prince of the Borjigin tribe of Mongols, but his legend
belongs to all Mongolian citizens.
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